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Abstract In terms of medical science and legal respon-
sibility, the sleep disorder category of parasomnias,
chiefly REM sleep behavior disorder and somnambu-
lism, pose an enigmatic dilemma. During an episode of
parasomnia, individuals are neither awake nor aware,
but their actions appear conscious. As these actions
move beyond the innocuous, such as eating and blurting
out embarrassing information, and enter the realm of
rape and homicide, their degree of importance and rel-
evance increases exponentially. Parasomnias that result
in illegal activity, particularly violence, are puzzling
phenomena for medicine and the law. Via a review of
the pertinent medical literature, a general overview of
the current scientific knowledge of parasomnias will be
provided. Though this knowledge is far from complete,
it can provide some neurobiological information about
the nature of parasomnia, including conclusions about a
sleepwalker’s level of intention as well as factors that
predispose one to such episodes. Although a
parasomniac’s complete lack of consciousness warrants
acquittal from criminal liability, it does not exclude
responsibility for subjecting oneself to exacerbating fac-
tors that result in these violent parasomnias. Individuals
should be held accountable if they could be expected to
control these factors. In addition, they should undergo
appropriate treatment and management in order to pre-
vent future parasomnia behaviors. Establishing a legal
defense for parasomnia will prove difficult due to the
strong potential for malingering, so specific criteria will
be outlined in order to distinguish between true and
fraudulent claims of crimes committed during
parasomniac states.
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Introduction
Several mornings in a row, a college acquaintance of
mine woke puzzled by the fact that he kept finding food
in his bed. Over the last month, his wrestling coach had
been pressuring him to gain weight in order to move up
a weight class, and he became so stressed about it that he
started to sleepwalk. He would get out of bed, walk to
his kitchen, and get food from his fridge and pantry.
Then, he would carry it back to his bed and eat until his
episode of Bsleep-eating^ ended. In the morning, he
would wake up surrounded by food.
Such night wanderings are pervasive. They appear in
friends’ anecdotes, in cartoons, on television, etc.
Sleepwalking has become such a widely known phe-
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characteristic image of a person meandering with arms
outstretched and eyes glazed over. As strange but harm-
less ventures out of bed, they provide entertaining
stories to share and unique phenomena to explore. How-
ever, when these episodes transition from sleepwalking
to a sort of Bsleep-acting,^ these actions become
problematic.
During the night of May 23, 1987, Kenneth Parks
rose from his bed and wandered out of his house and
into his car, driving 14 miles to the home of his mother-
and father-in-law in the neighboring town. Upon arriv-
ing at their home, he took a tire iron from the car and
entered the house. He then beat his mother-in-law to
death and choked his father-in-law. Now a blood-
spattered mess covered in cuts and bruises, he drove to
a nearby police station. In a confused manner, he told
the police that he Bthought^ he killed someone. Though
still confused, he identified his in-laws, murmuring that
it was Ball his fault.^ Eventually, Parks was tried for one
charge of murder and one charge of attempted murder.
His defense claimed that, during the entire episode, he
was sleepwalking [1].
The idea that a person can execute a coordinated act
of violence in their sleep opposes the stereotypical per-
ception that sleepwalkers are in a mindless daze,
performing actions over which they have no control or
awareness [2]. In this manner, they present a trouble-
some enigma. While these cases do not conform to the
stereotype, whether they overthrow it or are just disin-
genuous is unclear. Also, they bring a medical phenom-
enon into the realm of legal responsibility. Assuming
that sleepwalking can actually result in violence, the
legal system must figure out how to approach these
unique cases. To address these concerns, current medi-
cal knowledge must be united with legal standards.
The Stages of Sleep
To categorize the different stages of sleep, three standard
laboratory measures are used. The first, an electroen-
cephalogram (EEG), records brain activity in the form
of waves. The second, an electrooculogram (EOG),
notes eye movements. Finally, an electromyogram
(EMG) measures muscle activity via a sensor placed
on the chin (or alternatively on the arm or leg).
Sleep is divided into two parts: rapid eye movement
(REM) sleep and non-rapid eye movement (NREM)
sleep. When one first falls asleep, one usually enters
NREM sleep, which is divided into four stages. During
the first stage, thoughts start to drift, and the ability to
react to external stimuli begins to decrease [3, 4]. Mus-
cle activity begins to slow [3, 4]. As one moves through
the stages of NREM sleep, EEG waves grow in ampli-
tude and decrease in frequency – they become bigger
and slower. The Bdeep^ stages of sleep are NREM stage
3 and 4. Waking someone during these stages of sleep
often proves quite difficult, and the person awakens
feeling groggy and disoriented [4].
After the four stages of NREM sleep, one moves into
REM sleep, where dream mentation occurs and mani-
fests as some cerebral activity on the EEG [3]. During
this stage, the EOG shows rapid eye movements in
random directions, and the EMG indicates a complete
lack of muscle tone [4]. This muscle atonia prevents the
individual from acting out their dreams. If one attempts
to wake a person in REM sleep, it is usually effortless,
and the person wakes up with little disorientation [3].
Each complete sleep cycle (with both NREM and REM
sleep) lasts approximately 90 minutes in adults [4]. As
the night progresses, the time spent in stages 3 and 4 of
NREM sleep decreases while the time spent in REM
sleep increases [5].
Clinical Aspects of Sleep Disorders
Sleep disorders are generally divided into two major
categories. Dyssomnias refers to the group of sleep
disorders that manifests as Bexcessive sleepiness or dif-
ficulty in initiating or maintaining sleep^ [6, 7]. This
includes insomnia, narcolepsy, and circadian rhythm
disorders (such as jet lag and shift work disorder) [8].
Dyssomnias rarely become violent in a manner in which
they could be mistaken for awake and aware actions.
Parasomnias, the second category of sleep disorders,
occur during sleep and are marked by significant skele-
tal muscle activity [6, 7]. Simply put, parasomnias are
disorders that result in physical actions that are
completely uncharacteristic of sleep [9]. Many disorders
within the category of parasomnias are beyond the scope
of this discussion as they, like dyssomnias, rarely man-
ifest in violence. Two disorders are of particular interest
in this discussion: somnambulism and REM sleep be-
havior disorder (RBD) [10]. Though they can both result
in seemingly coordinated violent actions, the two disor-
ders are actually quite different.
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Somnambulism, colloquially known as sleepwalking,
appears as episodes of motor activity ranging from walk-
ing to driving and even violence among a variety of other
inappropriate (for sleep, that is) actions. It occurs during
the deepest stages of NREM sleep, stages 3 and 4. There-
fore, somnambulism is more likely to occur in the earlier
part of the night when these stages predominate. It is more
prevalent in males between 7 and 15 years of age, though
somnambulism that results in violence usually occurs in a
slightly older age group. The episodes typically last from a
few minutes to an hour and can occur from once a month
to multiple nights per week. Attempts to wake individuals
usually remain fruitless and sometimes even elicit violent
responses, such as aggressive and spastic limbmovements
[11, 12]. During the episode, the individual appears awake
but is unresponsive [11]. Sensory perceptions are virtually
switched off, so while the person can often navigate
around objects due to habit and simple stumbling, he does
not fully perceive any sight, smell, sound, or even pain
[13]. The individual’s eyes are usually directed upward
and inward, resulting in a vacant expression [12, 13]. In
addition, memories of the incident do not carry into the
waking state [11]. If awakened during a sleepwalking
episode, the individual usually remains confused and
disoriented for a period of time [11].
Recently, scholars have begun viewing somnambu-
lism as a new type of state dissociation. In this theory,
the states of wakefulness and sleep are not mutually
exclusive and can mix or oscillate rapidly [14]. A com-
bination of complex multifaceted mechanisms contrib-
utes to each state. The human body seems to have
constructed a reliable way to ensure that all of these
mechanisms usually synchronize. During state dissoci-
ation episodes, a majority of the mechanisms line up for
one particular state. In the case of somnambulism, the
body’s physiological mechanisms prepare to enter the
deep stages of NREM sleep [14]. However, some im-
portant mechanisms do not occur. In somnambulism,
significant motor activity (an aspect of wakefulness)
remains [14]. EEGs depict a mix of the large amplitude,
low frequency waves characteristic of stage 3 and 4
NREM sleep along with the low amplitude, high fre-
quency waves found in awake states [15]. Therefore,
according to state dissociation theory, somnambulism is
an amalgam of NREM sleep and wakefulness.
In contrast, REM sleep behavior disorder (RBD)
occurs during the REM stage of sleep. To recap, REM
sleep is marked by elaborate dreams as well as muscle
atonia that prevents individuals from acting out their
dreams [16]. In RBD, this muscle atonia is disabled
intermittently [16]. In terms of state dissociation theory,
RBD is considered a combination of REM sleep and
wakefulness (due to the presence of muscle tone) [14].
This results in a variety of behaviors that can range from
talking or screaming to thrashing one’s limbs about in
bed and even more seemingly coordinated violence.
However, individuals with RBD tend to awaken as their
feet hit the floor or soon after, so violent actions usually
target the bed partner or those nearby [14]. Because
RBD is essentially acting out one’s dreams, the individ-
ual will remember bits and pieces of the events from the
episode in the form of a vivid but disconnected dream
[17]. Furthermore, since one can awaken more easily
from the lighter REM sleep, the individual with RBD
will not appear as disoriented afterwards [17]. Finally,
RBD usually occurs in the later parts of sleep in the early
morning, when more time is spent in REM sleep [18].
Recently, a strong connection between RBD and a
group of degenerative neurological diseases, the
synucleinopathies, has begun to emerge [7, 19–22]. This
group includes Parkinson’s disease, dementia with Lewy
body disease, and multiple system atrophy [18]. In one
series of cases, over 2/3 of patients initially diagnosed
with RBD eventually developed symptoms of one of the
synucleinopathies [18, 21]. In this group of neurological
disorders, an aggregate fibrillar structure of a protein
called alpha-synuclein forms characteristic pathologic
lesions called Lewy bodies [23]. Unfortunately, the phys-
iological role of alpha-synuclein is still unknown.
At this point, let us revisit the case of Kenneth Parks,
the man who killed his mother-in-law and severely in-
jured his father-in-law and claimed he was sleepwalking.
Examining Parks’ account of his episode and the nature
of the actions, it is arguable that Parks was most likely in
an episode of somnambulism rather than RBD. First, his
episode was quite lengthy, allowing him to drive 14
miles. Furthermore, Parks had absolutely no memory
of the situation, not even a minor recollection of any
fragmented dreams, which would occur with RBD. Fi-
nally, Parks still appeared out of sorts when he arrived at
the police station after the incident [1].
Neurobiology of Parasomnias and Correlates
with Legal Responsibility
Alpha motor neurons control skeletal muscle fibers,
which are responsible for the majority of body
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movements. During sleep, the input signals to these
neurons change. Excitatory impulses, which depolarize
these neurons, decrease. Inhibitory signals, which hy-
perpolarize the alpha motor neurons, increase. To reach
the threshold potential in a hyperpolarized cell requires a
significantly greater net depolarization, i.e., a much
larger excitatory impulse, than achieving the threshold
from resting potential. Therefore, transmitting an action
potential to skeletal muscle is much less likely. During
REM sleep, the alpha motor neuron membranes are
significantly more hyperpolarized, making it even more
difficult for impulses to fire and cause movement [24].
Scientists initially believed that motor activity relied
on the cerebrum, and Blower brain structures^ only
sustained Bvegetative^ activities like breathing [25].
However, new discoveries have found that Bextremely
complex emotional and motor behaviors can originate
from [the brain stem and cerebellum] without involve-
ment of ‘higher’ neural structures^ [25]. Regions of the
brainstem and the cerebellum have been found to con-
tribute to the activity of motor neurons [24, 26]. Lesion
studies have shown that cell damage in specific areas in
the brainstem and cerebellum are connected with cases
of retention of muscle tone, i.e., suspension of muscle
atonia, during REM sleep and with seemingly conscious
wandering and violent movements [12, 19].
The cerebrum and cerebral cortex control and regu-
late actions, rather than initiate them as was previously
thought [25]. In humans, these structures are significant-
ly more developed than other animals [25]. They con-
tribute to the Bhigher^ intellectual abilities we typically
attribute to people, such as judgment, intention, reason-
ing, etc. [27]. Claudio Bassetti of the University of
Zurich has examined the brains of sleepwalkers [28].
Using single photon emission computerized tomogra-
phy (SPECT), he has noted that the cerebellum and
brainstem are active while the cerebrum and cerebral
cortex show little activity in sleepwalkers’ brains [28].
Coordination and integration of information between
different parts of the cerebral cortex is considered an
important precursor for consciousness [14]. Therefore,
while asleep, an individual essentially acts without any
consciousness. Parts of the cerebrum also contribute to
sensory processing and the formation of new memories,
which explains why individuals do not remember epi-
sodes of parasomnia.
The absence of consciousness during parasomnias
can be verified from more indirect evidence as well.
Sensory perception, voluntary control of motor activity,
and the ability to interact with and experience the world
are considered important aspects of consciousness. Dur-
ing episodes of parasomnia, individuals do not have any
sensory perception, memory formation, or responsive-
ness towards the environment – they have absolutely no
mental interaction with the outside world. In other
words, they are completely unaware during an episode
of parasomnia. Compare this to patients in a vegetative
state. These patients go through typical sleep and wake
cycles but are unconscious and unresponsive. In this
sense, they are often referred to as Bawake but not
aware.^ Individuals in parasomnia episodes are neither
awake nor aware. Since we consider individuals in a
vegetative state unconscious, we would consider indi-
viduals in an episode of parasomnia to be even less
conscious, if that is even possible.
To revisit the story of Kenneth Parks, if he was truly
sleepwalking during the attack on his in-laws, he had no
conscious intention to harm them. This point actually
came up during his trial. His relationship with his in-
lawswas thoroughly investigated; his wife even testified
that he had no motive to harm them [1]. Even though
Parks had been accused of embezzlement and was going
to be taken to court in the near future, his mother- and
father-in-law had always been supportive [1]. The in-
ability to form conscious intentions is a prominent char-
acteristic of parasomnias that has significant legal
ramifications.
Actus Reus and Mens Rea: Freedom
from Responsibility in Legal Theory
To understand how the law deals with violence commit-
ted during parasomnia, a preliminary review of legal
theory is required. Common law legal systems, found
in Great Britain and most of its former colonies, discuss
two components to every crime: actus reus, which is the
criminal act itself, and mens rea, which is the criminal
intent [29]. These components are derived from the
Latin phrase Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea,
which means Bthe deed does not make a man guilty
unless his mind is guilty^ [30]. If one of these compo-
nents is absent, the defendant is acquitted. In the cases in
question, mens rea is absent. Moreso, as mentioned in
the previous section, the individual is neither awake,
aware, nor able to make a decision to not act – such
actions are legally termed Bautomatisms.^ Several dif-
ferent definitions have arisen for this term. Some focus
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on the lack of awareness: the psychiatrists Hinsie and
Shatzky assert that it is Ba condition in which activity is
carried out without conscious knowledge on the part of
the subject^ [30]. Other definitions focus on the lack of
decision-making power, like Peter Fenwick who theo-
rizes that Ban automatism is an involuntary piece of
behavior over which an individual has no control^
[30]. Under either definition, parasomnias are clearly
automatisms. Automatisms usually lead to legal acquit-
tal due to the lack of mens rea.
Currently, automatisms are commonly divided into
two categories: sane and insane automatisms. This divi-
sion has been revisited most frequently in British law,
where such cases have appeared for many decades. Sane
automatisms result from an external factor, such as a
blow to the head, and result in complete acquittal. Insane
automatisms are due to some sort of internal factor like a
brain tumor or a psychological disorder, referred to as
Bdiseases of the mind;^ they traditionally result in com-
pulsory confinement in a psychiatric facility.
These categories have caused significant confusion
in cases where medicine and law intersect. For instance,
in the 1955 case R v. Charlson, a British court classified
an act that resulted from a cerebral tumor as a sane
automatism despite a cerebral tumor appearing an inter-
nal causal factor [31]. In this case, the judge focused on
the connotations of Bsanity^ and Binsanity:^ he ac-
knowledged that a cerebral tumor was not analogous
to psychological insanity and did not warrant confine-
ment in a mental asylum. However, two years later in R
v. Kemp, Ban automatic act committed in a confusional
state due to arteriosclerosis^ was labeled an insane
automatism [32]. The judge in Kemp focused on the
fact that the cause was internal and affected the defen-
dant’s reasoning ability, not on how it fit the connotation
of insanity or on the associated penal consequences.
Then, in 1963, the case Bratty v. Attorney-General for
Northern Ireland addressed the issue of violence during
epileptic episodes [33]. The presiding judge Lord Den-
ning opined that Bany mental disorder which has man-
ifested itself in violence and is prone to recur is a disease
of the mind,^ i.e., an insane automatism [33]. While
epilepsy appears to fit this statement, Lord Denning
excluded it from this category, as he chose to focus
instead on the penal consequences [33]. He stated that
epilepsy Bis the sort of disease for which a person should
be detained in hospital rather than be given an unqual-
ified acquittal^ or be admitted to a psychiatric facility
[33]. Though this comment could be extrapolated to
parasomnias, British courts have continued to classify
violence during parasomnias as insane automatisms.
While these judgments were of different courts through-
out the United Kingdom, it is evident that these catego-
ries have caused conflicting legal decisions and failed to
establish a clear precedent [30]. This is particularly
concerning in common law tradition, which is largely
based on precedent.
In fact, the distinction between sane and insane au-
tomatisms presents a dilemma for discussions of vio-
lence committed during episodes of parasomnia. Almost
all scholars consider parasomnias an effect of some sort
of neurological sleep disturbance.With this internal type
of cause, violent actions performed during parasomnias
seem to fall into the category of insane automatisms.
However, it hardly seems appropriate to place individ-
uals who sleepwalk in mental institutions – they are far
from mentally ill. Still, it is inappropriate to let
parasomniacs walk away from such violent actions free
of any legal responsibility and with no further require-
ments to take proper steps to manage their parasomnias.
Therefore, classification as a sane automatism seems
insufficient as well. Overall, the implication of the
sanity/insanity distinction is one that makes little sense
with regard to parasomnias and many other medical
issues as well.
A Novel Perspective on Automatisms
Before considering proposals for a better system for the
legal categorization of parasomnias, it is important to
note that parasomnias usually surface and result in vio-
lence due to exacerbating factors. These can include
family history, drug/alcohol abuse, stress, and/or sleep
deprivation, among others. Since many of these factors
are external, they would be categorized as sane autom-
atisms. However, many idiopathic cases of parasomnia
as well as those associated with family history would be
categorized as insane automatisms. Clearly, the current
endeavor to label violence during parasomnia as a sane
or insane automatism is counterintuitive. It is better to
appreciate that violence during parasomnias manifests
in different ways and is evoked by different factors in
different individuals. In concordance, there should be
different levels of legal responsibility and appropriate
legal consequences. The unclear dichotomy between
sane and insane automatisms cannot be applied easily
and sensibly.
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Instead, consider a gradient based upon a notion of a
reasonable degree of control. It would lead to more fruitful
prescription of legal responsibility and consequences. On
one extreme would be automatisms caused by factors
within one’s control. Individuals with such automatisms
would be held legally responsible for their actions. Aris-
totle alludes to this concept with an example in his work
Ethics: even though a drunken individual does not act
voluntarily or with full capacity while he is intoxicated,
he acts voluntarily and with mental capacity when choos-
ing to become intoxicated and should therefore be held
accountable for doing so [34]. An individual whose
parasomnia episodes are triggered by excessive alcohol
consumption or other factors within their control mirrors
this example. Under current jurisprudence, such a case
would be classified as a sane automatism since alcohol
consumption is an external factor, and the parasomniac
individual would be acquitted. By contrast, in the new
schema, the actions of the parasomniac individual would
be classified as automatisms triggered by factors within
one’s control, and the individual would be held legally
responsible for his actions.
Though this new manner of classification is not fool-
proof, it is clearly an improvement from the sane vs.
insane automatism schema. To determine how to classi-
fy an automatism, the operative question would be
BCould the individual, at the time that the instigating
factor(s) came into play, be reasonably expected to act
differently so as to change the outcome?^ This question
gauges the level of control and decision-making ability
involved in the circumstances that put one in a vulner-
able position for violent parasomnias. Consider this
question in one of the previous examples. For the indi-
vidual who sleepwalks due to a family history, the
answer to this question would be no. It is important to
note that he could still attempt to actively manage his
sleepwalking and prevent putting himself in situations
that further exacerbate his tendency to sleepwalk, so a
family history should not automatically warrant release
from responsibility.
This new schema provides a meaningful division
with regard to the question of legal responsibility. Peo-
ple who exhibit automatistic behavior due to factors out
of their control should not be held responsible for their
actions while people who perform automatisms due to
factors within their control should be held accountable.
There is some middle ground between these two ex-
tremes that can be left to the interpretation of the judge
and jury.
There is also a more natural division in terms of legal
consequences. Since people who exhibit automatistic
behavior due to factors out of their control cannot rea-
sonably be held responsible for their actions, they
should be acquitted for a criminal offense committed
while in such an automatistic state. Still, while they are
not guilty of the crime in itself, they should be held
accountable for seeking appropriate treatment or inter-
vention options to manage or eliminate their particular
sleep disorder. Consider this qualification in the context
of cases in which even amoderate amount of a particular
prescription medication or alcohol can evoke
parasomnias. For instance, think of a family that is
particularly sensitive to tequila. If any of the individuals
in this family drink even a small amount of tequila, they
will sleepwalk and, during these sleepwalking episodes,
attempt to engage in dangerous behaviors such as
attempting to drive. Consider this in the context of the
key question: BCould the individual, at the time that the
instigating factor(s) came into play, be reasonably ex-
pected to act differently so as to change the outcome?^
This family, because they are aware of the likelihood of
their adverse reaction to tequila, could be reasonably
expected to act differently so that they do not sleepwalk
and put themselves and others in harm’s way. However,
consider this paradigm in the context of an individual
who is not aware of his heightened sensitivity to a
particular drug or alcohol. For example, the medication
zolpidem (Ambien) has been shown to produce
parasomnias in some individuals even when taken as
directed [35–37]. If an individual took the medication
for the first time in the manner in which he was
instructed and had no reason to suspect that this could
cause him to act in a dangerous or uncharacteristic way,
any resulting automatisms are beyond his control. No
one can reasonably expect these individuals to not take a
medication that a doctor tells them will assuage their
complaints.
Under the proposed system of classification, an initial
pardon should be applied for these scenarios. Assuming
the amount of drug/alcohol consumption was reason-
able and that the individual had no reason to suspect an
adverse reaction from consumption, his first incident
would be excused, as he cannot reasonably be expected
to act any other way. However, once he realizes the
substance’s effects on him, he should know to avoid
the drug or alcohol that evokes parasomnias and subse-
quent violence. If an additional offense occurs after the
individual can be reasonably expected to be aware of his
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sensitivity, then he would be held responsible. In these
contrasting scenarios, the question BCould the individ-
ual, at the time that the instigating factor(s) came into
play, be reasonably expected to act differently so as to
change the outcome?^ provides an adequate rule of
thumb.
On the other hand, people who commit violent au-
tomatisms due to factors that are within their control can
be held responsible for their actions and should be tried
in a court of law. However, since the automatism had no
mens rea, the automatistic act itself is not considered the
crime. Instead, they should be held accountable for
putting themselves in the situation where they are vul-
nerable to violent parasomnias. In other words, they
should be held responsible for the factor over which
they had control (such as drug abuse, alcohol abuse,
etc.) and tried accordingly for their recklessness and/or
failure to take appropriate precautions. This can be
compared to the recent legal cases in which sleep-
deprived drivers have been held accountable for deaths
that result from them falling asleep behind the wheel –
usually, it is a charge of manslaughter. In these cases, a
stipulation is usually made that the sleep deprivation has
to result from some sort of recklessness or gross negli-
gence on the driver’s part. For example, think of a
college student who pulls an all-nighter and then gets
in a car and finds himself falling asleep at the wheel.
This student had ample opportunity to choose not to pull
the all-nighter or choose not to drive, especially when he
realized he was falling asleep while driving. He would
be held responsible for any resulting harm. Sleep depri-
vation is also an exacerbating factor for parasomnias, so
this same example can be extrapolated to violent acts
performed during episodes of parasomnia, especially if
violent automatisms were a foreseeable consequence of
the sleep deprivation.
Applying this new classification system to the case of
Kenneth Parks proves quite interesting. During his trial,
his defense presented Parks’ history of sleepwalking
since childhood and proclivity for long, elaborate epi-
sodes of sleepwalking when exposed to various exacer-
bating factors, especially mental stress [1]. At the time
of the incident, Parks was incredibly anxious due to his
upcoming embezzlement trial [1]. From the numerous
arguments of his defense to support a defense of
sleepwalking, it seemed evident that Park should have
been reasonably aware of his tendency to sleepwalk, his
sensitivity to stressors, and his likelihood of engaging in
dangerous activities like driving while sleepwalking.
Therefore, it can be considered negligent for him not
to have sought medical care and taken appropriate pre-
cautions to, if not prevent sleepwalking, at least ensure
his and others’ safety during these episodes. In the
context of the significant mental stress from his embez-
zlement trial, it can even be considered reckless on his
part. Therefore, Parks’ violence would fall into the
category of automatisms due to factors within the de-
fendant’s control.
The entire discussion of Parks’ case up to this point
has functioned on the assumption that his plea of
parasomnia was an honest one. It is important to con-
sider the possibility that Parks was lying, and it was not
a true case of somnambulism. During his trial, this was
hotly debated – each side grew fierce in their arguments,
and both made plausible claims in favor of their opin-
ions [1].
Qualifications for a Plea of Parasomnia
When establishing a legal defense for violence commit-
ted during parasomnia, it is important to consider the
potential abuse of such a defense. A stringent and unbi-
asedmethod for filtering through these pleas can combat
many cases of malingering. Unfortunately, there is a
limit to the level of rigidity possible in these criteria
for several reasons. First, current knowledge on sleep
disorders is still somewhat limited, and future data and
research could greatly enhance our understanding. Sec-
ond, parasomnias vary from individual to individual, so
creating a universally applicable set of criteria is ex-
tremely difficult. The best compromise is a set of basic,
flexible guidelines that suggest what a jury should con-
sider when distinguishing a true case of parasomnia
from a fake one:
1. Results of clinical polysomnographic tests
The most definitive way to diagnose a sleep
disorder is an in-depth polysomnography test [38].
Conducted over several nights, these tests consist of
an EEG, EOG, and EMG to measure any abnormal-
ities in brain, muscle, and/or eye activity. Sleep
experts with many years of experience should inter-
pret the results of these tests. After several thorough
overnight polysomnographic examinations, they
can postulate about how likely it is that a particular
person has a sleep disorder and introduce these
possibilities to the court [38].
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2. Contribution of an unbiased medical practitioner
In addition to an expert’s interpretation of the
polysomnography results, it is imperative to involve
an experienced medical practitioner, particularly
one knowledgeable in forensic aspects of
parasomnias, in the trial itself. First, they can edu-
cate the judge and jury about the legitimate possi-
bility of violence during an episode of parasomnia.
Second, they can guide the jury through the criteria
for diagnosis and confirmation of a parasomnia,
explaining which aspects of the episode in question
indicate a true parasomnia and which seem to indi-
cate that one did not occur.
Within the current adversarial legal system, the
prosecution and the defense involve their own ex-
pert witnesses and reimburse these experts of their
own accord. Unfortunately, in the past, this has led
to subtle biases, devolved into character attacks, and
overall confused the jury, especially in heated cases
such as those of Kenneth Parks [1]. Efforts should
be made to prevent this, possibly by eliminating the
partisan nature of expert testimonies and introduc-
ing court-appointed expert witnesses that present
both supporting and opposing evidence. However,
such a discussion is beyond the scope of this work.
3. Time of the night
Asmentioned, cases of violence during somnam-
bulism are more likely to occur at earlier times of
the night, within 3 to 4 hours of the individual
falling asleep. On the other hand, RBD typically
occurs during the later part of the night, closer to the
morning. This is simply a correlation between the
general population’s physiological sleep cycle and
the pathophysiology of RBD and somnambulism. It
can only serve to support existing reasoning for a
diagnosis. Alone, the time of the night during which
the episode of violent parasomnia occurs is a weak
support for a claim of parasomnia. Still, it can
strengthen claims, as it is a consistent observation.
4. Exacerbating factors, i.e., stress, sleep deprivation,
alcohol, fever, drugs, and/or breathing disorders
As stated previously, most sleep disorders sur-
face due to an exacerbating factor. Because these
factors can vary widely from person to person, an
expert opinion and clinical polysomnography test-
ing are invaluable in highlighting the presence and
likelihood of an exacerbating factor specific to the
defendant. The factors listed above are the most
common [39]. They each strain the body in some
manner, which manifests during sleep as sleep dis-
turbances [39]. Breathing disorders, such as ob-
structive sleep apnea, sleep-disordered breathing,
and upper airway resistance syndrome, cause hy-
percapnia and hypoxia which then arouse the body
in an attempt to trigger muscles involved in breath-
ing. If motor control neurons that contribute to
walking and other motor functions are also activat-
ed, this can cause parasomnia.
Though large-scale studies on alcohol consump-
tion resulting in parasomnias have not been conduct-
ed, many case reports describe such examples [40].
Among scholars, this has led to the acceptance of
alcohol as a contributing factor towards parasomnias,
especially violent ones. In addition, studies show that
during the first part of sleep, alcohol significantly
increases the amount of NREM deep sleep [39]. This
would increase time and opportunity for an episode
of somnambulism to occur during the first part of
sleep, which is when it is already most likely to occur
(as discussed previously). During the second half of
sleep periods, alcohol increases time spent in REM
sleep and also makes sleep lighter and more easily
disrupted [39]. As discussed earlier, RBD is more
likely to occur during the latter half of a sleep period,
and these changes would further increase opportunity
for an episode.
Finally, different drugs have also been linked to
sleepwalking. To differentiate between appropriate
drug use and abuse and determine the possibility that
a particular drug impacted sleep, a medical expert
witness should be involved since a thorough list of
potential drugs is continuously evolving. The medi-
cal expert can present up-to-date pharmaceutical re-
search and case reports and explain how they relate to
the case.
5. Family history
Somnambulism is typically associated with a
strong family history [39]. The Bpresence of
sleepwalking or a related disorder in a first-degree
relative increases the chances of developing this
disorder by a factor of 10^ [39]. Also, in individual
case studies of sleepwalkers, a family history of
sleepwalking is usually present. A recently pub-
lished study identified the HLA gene DQB1, which
is present in 35 % of sleepwalkers (as compared
with 13.3 % of non-sleepwalkers) [39]. This is an
interesting diagnostic finding though not complete,
for 65 % of sleepwalkers still lack the gene.
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Few studies comment on a hereditary correlation
in RBD. However, since Parkinson’s, Lewy Body
disease, and the other alpha-synucleinopathies often
manifest over several generations, it is likely that
RBD could as well [21]. For this reason, document-
ed or witnessed accounts of first degree relatives
experiencing associated sleep disturbances can sup-
port a case of alleged parasomnia, either RBD or
somnambulism [22].
6. Witness accounts of the characteristics of the ac-
cused
People who observed the defendant during the
episode can attest to how the defendant appeared,
which is important for confirmation of parasomnia.
Awitness can attest to how lucid and responsive the
defendant appeared as well as how he performed the
actions – in a coordinated and calculated way or in
more haphazard manner. They could also provide
information about other aspects of the episode, such
as if the defendant sought out the victim and how
the defendant appeared uponwaking: if he appeared
surprised and astonished at where he found himself,
if he seemed disoriented, if he tried to cover up his
actions, etc. [25]. The description can then be com-
pared with the expected demeanor of a parasomnia,
as described by the medical expert witness. Since
the defendant, in a case of true parasomnia, would
not remember the episode, a secondary opinion is
the closest account a jury can receive.
7. Intentionality of the violence
In a 2007 series, Mark Pressman examined 32
cases of violence during somnambulism in medical
and legal literature. In a majority of these cases, he
noted that closeness and proximity played a prom-
inent role [41]. Individuals typically did not seek out
the targets of their violence. Rather, they came
across them circumstantially, or the targets
approached and/or provoked them [42]. Though
this case series includes a small and nonrandomized
sample, proximity and provocation still appear to be
significant triggers of violent behaviors during som-
nambulism [41]. This eliminates the notion of mo-
tivation on the sleepwalker’s part. Usually, victims
of this violence are not even people that the sleep-
walker knows or towards whom he or she feels
begrudged, just people whom circumstance brought
into the proximity of the sleepwalker. It is important
to note that Kenneth Parks, who drove 14 miles and
attacked his mother- and father-in-law, is an
exception to this pattern. His defense successfully
argued that he routinely drove the 14 mile route to
the home of his in-laws, so it was almost second
nature to him [1]. This leads us to another trou-
bling exception, which occurs with the bed partner
and/or family members who live with the sleep-
walker. These individuals are obviously in proxim-
ity to the sleepwalker. However, there can be some
suspicion of an underlying motive because the
sleepwalker typically knows them quite well. In
these situations, the relationship between the sleep-
walker and the victim should be thoroughly inves-
tigated, and any problematic findings should be
introduced to the court (as has been the practice
thus far).
Studies of RBD have not been developed as
much as those for somnambulism. However, one
can still draw several conclusions from anecdotes
about episodes of RBD and what is currently known
about this disorder. Since this parasomnia involves
dream mentation, it differs from somnambulism in
terms of the manifestation of intention. Consider the
1858 case of Esther Griggs. In this case, Griggs
dreamt that she heard someone screaming BFire!^
She ran into her baby’s bedroom and threw the child
out the window to its death in an attempt to save it
from the fire in her dream [30]. In this case, an
intention is present but only in the parameters of
the dream. Other cases often report the defendant
dreaming about being attacked [41]. They then try to
defend themselves with guns or other objects in the
vicinity, hurting people around them in the process.
Therefore, in cases of RBD, some haphazard inten-
tion within the context of the dream usually does
exist, but this intention will rarely make sense out of
the dream. Furthermore, the execution of dream
intentions would be poor and a little careless – these
individuals may utilize any nearby objects to attack
whoever is close rather than a selected target. This
kind of motivation generally does not qualify as the
required mens rea for most criminal cases. Compare
this scenario to that of delusional schizophrenics.
These patients construct a world of illusion, often
full of conspiracies against them. As a result, they
grow suspicious of particular people around them
andmay eventually act out against these individuals.
When these cases make it to court, these individuals
are not considered to have appropriate lucid inten-
tion, and they usually qualify for an insanity plea.
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The intention present in RBD within the dream
resembles the intention present in delusional schizo-
phrenics within their delusion. Despite the presence
of this sort of distorted motive, it does not fit the
necessary standards of mens rea and is therefore
insufficient for legal accountability.
8. Memory upon waking
As mentioned earlier, the area in the cerebrum
responsible for memory formation and information
retention is inactive during sleep. Therefore, any
actions that occur during an episode of parasomnia
are not remembered [43].While a defendant with no
memory of the event can be frustrating legally, the
lack of memory is a significant factor in support of
true parasomnias. The amnesia does not have to be
complete. Especially in cases of RBD, amnesia
would not be akin to a total black out [44]. The
presence of dream mentation would result in a
fragmented and hazy memory. Still, a significant
level of amnesia should be present in order for the
defendant to claim that they had been asleep at the
time of the violent actions. Of course retrograde
amnesia can occur for other reasons, so other po-
tential causes for amnesia should be investigated.
9. Childhood history
Much debate surrounds the likelihood of chil-
dren suffering from somnambulism continuing to
exhibit parasomnias in adulthood. Because the
length of NREM sleep shortens as one grows older,
most people actually grow out of it. However, peo-
ple who sleepwalk during childhood do show
higher rates of somnambulism during adulthood
than the remainder of the population. This is not a
significant factor, as it is statistically unlikely that
most children who sleepwalk will continue to do so
in adulthood. It can provide some minor support for
an argument though. For RBD, this trend does not
hold. It has appeared primarily in older populations,
so a presence of childhood parasomnia is irrelevant.
Conclusion
If we take these factors and apply them back to the case
of Kenneth Parks, it is possible that a different outcome
of the case could occur. Parks was acquitted of both
charges. However, at the t ime of his case,
polysomnography was a new diagnostic procedure –
its importance was not well understood, and it was not
a common test. Therefore, a polysomnography test was
not performed and admitted into evidence at Parks’ trial.
It should be customary in cases now to conduct a thor-
ough polysomnography evaluation in order to provide
additional information for the judge and jury to assess
the validity of a plea of parasomnia. As stated earlier,
this kind of diagnostic evaluation is the best way to
prove a propensity to sleepwalk.
In addition, the contributions of medical practitioners
in this case became a sticky situation. This case was one
of many that devolved into a mudslinging competition
in an attempt to discredit the involved medical opinions.
There was also significant suspicion of exaggerated
medical opinions in return for incentives provided to
the expert witnesses called by each side. If the judge had
appointed a non-partisan medical professional, these
issues might have been avoided. Some scholars believe
that this in itself was the reason the case turned out the
way it did, and that an unbiased medical perspective
would have led the case in a completely different
direction.
Parks’ attorney emphasized Parks’ exacerbating
factors: his lack of intention, the accounts of his
demeanor at the police station, his stress over his
upcoming embezzlement trial, and his childhood his-
tory of sleepwalking [1]. Still, many scholars remain
quite skeptical about the outcome of the trial. He
drove 14 miles to seek out his targets [1]. His rela-
tionship with the victims is also of concern, but Parks’
attorneys skillfully addressed these concerns by draw-
ing attention to Parks’ positive relationship with his
in-laws and his familiarity with the route to their
home [1].
In the end, though it seems easy to imagine that Parks
was not sleepwalking, it is difficult to make any asser-
tions as to whether the outcome of the Parks trial should
have been different. This demonstrates a clear need for
changes in the way violence during episodes of
parasomnia are handled in the law and in court. First,
the legal system needs a better understanding of
parasomnias in order to become familiar with the types
of actions possible during these episodes. In addition, a
different manner of assigning legal responsibility will
improve classification of these actions and prescribe
more appropriate legal consequences. This would leave
juries with more options (and more appropriate options)
than complete acquittal or confinement to a psychiatric
hospital. Finally, more specific and detailed guidelines
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for claiming a plea of parasomnia could resolve some of
the heated debate and concern for malingering that
typically surrounds these cases. The proposals set forth
in this work fill these needs by synthesizing science and
law in an attempt to improve the way violent
parasomnias are handled.
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